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Abstract
This article considers Australia’s treatment of stateless Pal-
estinian asylum seekers and discusses whether that treat-
ment discharges Australia’s legal and/or moral obligations
towards the individuals in question. The conclusion
drawn is that it does not.
Résumé
L’article prend en considération le traitement que l’Aus-
tralie réserve aux demandeurs d’asile palestiniens apatri-
des et demande si ce traitement décharge l’Australie de
ses obligations juridiques et/ou morales envers les indivi-
dus en question. La conclusion établit qu’il n’en est rien.
Introduction
T
he primary function of the  state is to protect  its
associated people (its nationals) from Hobbes’s “war
of all against all.” Unfortunately, there are about nine
million people worldwide who are in the situation of being
“cast adrift from the global political system of nation
states.”1 These people are “not considered as a national by
any State under the operation of its law” and hence are de
jure stateless.2 Refugees, by contrast, may well possess the
nationality of some country, but find themselves persecuted
rather than protected in their country of nationality.3 Some
stateless persons are unlucky enough to be refugees as well,
meaning that they find themselves faced with persecution in
their country of habitual residence.
In an earlier era than our own, not much distinction was
drawn between stateless persons and refugees because what
was considered significant was what they had in common
– their lack of state protection.4 However, the trend since
World War II has been that the international community
has focused less and less on the fact that an individual lacks
state protection and more and more on the reasons for the
lack in determining whether or not to provide substitute
protection. Those who lack state protection for reasons
other than the reasons set out in the Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention)5 have found
themselves increasingly marginalized. In particular, while
there is a Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons (Statelessness Convention)6 only 57 states7 are par-
ties to it compared to the 145 states8 that are parties to the
Refugee Convention and/or Refugee Protocol.
This article considers the plight of the approximately
3,723,036 Palestinians who are not formally nationals (citi-
zens) of any country,9 i.e. are de jure stateless. It then
considers the extent to which these individuals are able to
rely for protection on the two treaty regimes specified above
and  on the  more general  body  of international human
rights law. The article next considers whether Australia’s
treatment of stateless Palestinians complies fully with all of
its obligations under the Refugee Convention, the Stateless-
ness Convention, and the general body of international
human rights law and concludes that it does not. Finally,
the article argues that Australia not only has international
legal obligations towards stateless Palestinians but also
moral obligations incurred through past action. It suggests
that in order to discharge these moral obligations Australia
should not only meet its strict legal obligations to stateless
Palestinians but also give serious consideration to confer-
ring its own nationality on stateless Palestinians in Australia
who have nowhere else to turn.
The Palestinians
For as long as the three great monotheistic religions have
been in existence, the territorial entity now described as
Palestine  has  had a distinct identity  derived  from those
religions. It is the Holy Land.10 The Jews settled Palestine
about one thousand years before the birth of Christ. How-
ever, by the end of the seventh century most of the popula-
tion of Palestine was Arab and Muslim and in 1516 it became
part of the Ottoman Empire.11 From about 1882, Jews began
migrating or returning (depending on your point of view)
to the Holy Land. From about 1904–5, most of the migrants
were angry young men and their goal was to make “Palestine
become as Jewish as England is English.”12 In other words,
they were Zionists.
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At the time Jewish migration commenced, the Holy Land
had a permanent population of about 462,000 persons.
Most of these inhabitants were Arab Muslims, some were
Arab Christians, and about 15,000 were Jews.13 By 1914, the
population of Palestine had increased to over 720,000 of
whom about 60,000 were Jews and the rest Arab.14
During World War I, the Ottoman Empire allied itself
with Germany and in the course of the war Britain and
France  occupied  its territories. Just before Armistice  in
1918, those two countries announced that they intended
“the complete and definitive liberation of the peoples so
long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of na-
tional Governments and Administrations drawing their
authority from the initiative and free choice of the indige-
nous populations.”15 What they in fact did after World War
I was to follow through on a secret plan to carve up former
Ottoman territory between themselves.16 Palestine, Jordan
and Iraq went to Britain.17
In place of straight out colonial rule, Britain and France
had themselves appointed as League of Nations Mandato-
ries of the territories they acquired during the war. Manda-
tories were given supervision and control of  mandated
territories, but not sovereignty over them.18 Article 22 of
the Covenant of the League of Nations (the Covenant)
provided:
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the
late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States
which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by
people not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous
conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the
principle that the wellbeing of such people form a sacred trust
of civilization…
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that
the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced
nations…and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as
Mandatories on behalf of the League.19
As David Abernethy points out, this “acknowledgement by
colonial powers that they had a moral and legal responsibil-
ity to foster the well-being of colonized people on behalf of
the larger international community was an important break
from the past.”20 The Arab inhabitants of Palestine were
unimpressed. They believed  for  a  start  that Britain  had
reneged on the promise of liberation made just before Ar-
mistice. Moreover, it was evident to them that the terms of
the Palestine Mandate were geared not towards giving effect
to the principles set out in Article 22 of the Covenant but
rather towards giving effect to the Balfour Declaration of
November 1917 in which Britain had supported “the estab-
lishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish
people.” Article 22 of the Covenant stated:
Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Em-
pire have reached a stage of development where their existence
as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject
to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a
Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.
Yet, as Omar Dajani points out,
in contrast to its numerous explicit commitments to the estab-
lishment of a “Jewish national home” in Palestine, the Mandate
referred to the indigenous Arab population of the country,
which in 1922 represented almost 90% of Palestine’s total popu-
lation, primarily in contradistinction to the Jewish population.
The Mandate, therefore, transformed the “independent nation”
provisionally recognized by the Covenant into an assortment of
“non-Jewish communities” that happened to reside within the
borders of the territory of Palestine.21
Article 2 of the Palestine Mandate at least provided that in
addition to “placing the country under such political, ad-
ministrative and economic conditions as will secure the
establishment of the Jewish national home,” the Mandatory
was responsible for “the development of self-governing in-
stitutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious
rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race
and religion.”22 However, Britain did not in fact allow the
Palestinians to develop self-governing institutions for fear
that this would jeopardize the establishment of a Jewish
homeland in Palestine.23 By contrast, during the mandate
period, the Zionists managed to put in place a ‘continuum
of “Jewish territory”’ and a parallel Jewish polity in Pales-
tine.24
During the interwar period, 100,000 European Jews mi-
grated to Palestine. Many were, of course, refugees fleeing
the spread of Nazism.25 However, Arab Palestinians fo-
cused on their own dispossession and responded to Jewish
settlement with an armed uprising which commenced in
1936 and was finally put down by the British in 1939.26 By
then war was looming in Europe and British Prime Minister
Neville Chamberlain took the view that it was more impor-
tant to have the Arabs on-side than the Jews.27 In order to
placate the Arabs, Britain placed restrictions on Jewish
immigration and promised that Palestine would be given
independence within ten years.28
Immediately after World War II, Palestine had an Arab
population of approximately 1.06 million people and a
Jewish population of approximately 554,000 people.29 In
other words, the Arabs outnumbered the Jews two to one.
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The Zionist movement, through an organization known as
the Jewish Agency, demanded that Britain allow the
100,000  Jews displaced by World War II  to  migrate  to
Palestine.30 Britain, which was preparing to give inde-
pendence to Palestine, decided to continue with the quota
of 1,500 Jewish migrants per month that it had imposed in
1939.31 The military arm of the Jewish Agency, Haganah,
and two underground Zionist organizations responded by
waging an undeclared war or campaign of terror (again,
depending on your point of view) against British authori-
ties in Palestine.32
By 1947, Britain had had enough and asked the United
Nations to sort out the problem. The United Nations estab-
lished an eleven-member Special Committee on Palestine
(UNSCOP), which reported to the United Nations General
Assembly in August 1947. The majority (seven members)33
recommended the partition of Palestine into a Jewish state
comprising 56 per cent of the territory and an Arab state
comprising  43  per  cent of  the  territory.  It also  recom-
mended the internationalization of Jerusalem, since the city
was holy to Jews, Christians, and Muslims.34 A minority
(three members) recommended that independent Palestine
be established as a federal state.35 The eleventh member
(Australia) chose to abstain from making any recommen-
dation.36 The Zionists were pleased with the majority rec-
ommendations. The Arabs were not, since what was being
recommended was that a minority of the population get the
majority of the territory. Nevertheless, on 29 November
1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed a reso-
lution which endorsed the partition recommendation by a
two-thirds majority.37
According to the historian Tom Segev, “No one believed
in the UN’s map, everyone knew there would be war.”38
However, Britain was determined to wash its hands of
Palestine.39 The British High Commissioner and the last
British troops left Palestine on 14 May 1948, the very day
that the mandate terminated.40 On that day, David Ben-
Gurion, the head of the Jewish Agency, declared that the
state of Israel had come into being. Palestine’s Arab neigh-
bours responded by sending in their troops. By the end of
1948, the Israeli forces had routed them all.41 In the first
part of 1949, Israel signed a series of armistice agreements
with its neighbours, i.e. with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and
Syria. Under the agreements Israel got to keep considerably
more territory than it would have received under the
United Nations partition arrangement (77 per cent of man-
datory Palestine).42 Jordan and Egypt respectively were left
in control of those parts of mandatory Palestine known as
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (the remaining 23 per
cent of mandatory Palestine).43
On 27 January 1949, Britain and Australia announced
their recognition of Israel.44 Australia also moved the for-
mal resolution recommending Israel’s admission as a mem-
ber of the United Nations.45 On 18 May 1949,  Israel’s
application for United Nations membership was approved.
At the beginning of 1950, the new state of Israel had a
population of one million Jews and about 150,000 Arabs.
This was because on the one hand Jewish immigration to
Israel continued while on the other most Arabs inhabitants
had fled or been expelled during the 1948 war.46 The extent
to which displacement was caused by the latter rather than
the former is the subject of bitter contestation,47 since even
at the time mass expulsion was regarded as a war crime and
a crime against humanity.48 In any event, the displaced
Arabs are not regarded as Israeli nationals under Israeli
law.49 Moreover, they are not permitted by Israel to return
to the homes they left. Whether Israel’s position on nation-
ality and/or return is defensible under international law is,
unsurprisingly, the subject of further controversy.50
After the 1948 war, 470,000 displaced Palestinians settled
in camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.51 Over 280,000
more Palestinians also displaced during the 1948 war dis-
persed to neighbouring countries, with most going to Jor-
dan, Lebanon, or Syria.52 During the Six Day War of 1967,
in the course of which Israel fought with Egypt, Syria, and
Jordan, further displacement occurred with 800,000 West
Bank inhabitants and 150,000 Gaza Strip inhabitants flee-
ing into Jordan.53
After the 1967 war, those who remained in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip found themselves living under Israeli rule
though still without Israeli nationality.54 Pursuant to the
1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement and the 1995 Interim Agree-
ment, Israel transferred responsibility for civil governance
of some parts of the occupied territories to the Palestinian
Authority.55 However, the non-Jewish inhabitants of the
occupied territories remain de jure stateless56 and, far from
being protected by either Israel or the Palestinian Author-
ity, are subjected to serious human rights abuses by both.
These abuses include arbitrary deprivation of life; torture
and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment; arbitrary arrest and detention; arbitrary interfer-
ence with privacy, family, and home; and denial of freedom
of movement.57
All Palestinians living in Jordan, except those who fled
from the Gaza Strip in 1967, have been permitted to acquire
Jordanian citizenship and enjoy the rights which go with
citizenship.58 However, most Palestinian refugees in Syria
and Lebanon (including the descendants of the original
refugees) are unable to acquire the citizenship of their host
country.59 In Syria they at least enjoy many of the same
rights as Syrian citizens do.60 However, in Lebanon they
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have extremely limited work rights, have no access to social
assistance, are denied freedom of movement, and have, in
fact, been persecuted at various times by state and non-state
actors.61
Palestinians and International Protection
Asylum
Reference is often made to the fact that Article 14(1) of the
United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights
(UDHR)62 provides that “everyone has the right to seek and
enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”63 How-
ever, the drafting history of the UDHR indicates that the
provision cannot be read as meaning that an individual
asylum seeker has the right to be granted asylum by the
country of his choice or any country.64
At one stage in the drafting process, Article 14 did in fact
provide that everyone had “the right to seek and be granted
in other countries asylum from persecution.” This formu-
lation was strongly advocated by the World Jewish Con-
gress, which had in mind the experience of German Jews
who had attempted to flee the Holocaust but had been
denied entry by other countries. However, Saudi Arabia
proposed the deletion of the words ”and be granted" and
was supported in this by most Arab countries. Arab oppo-
sition to the inclusion of the words “and be granted” ap-
pears to have been a response to the mass displacement of
Palestinians which was occurring at the time. According to
Johannes Morsink,  “[t]hese countries  probably thought
that a vote for the human right to be granted asylum would
in effect saddle them with half a million refugees to cloth,
feed, and house,” though from their point of view the only
just solution to the Palestinians’ plight was repatriation.
The amendment proposed by Saudi Arabia was carried
by a vote of eighteen to fourteen with eight abstentions.
Australia and Britain were among the non-Arab countries
to vote for the amendment. Britain proposed the present
wording of Article 14 and was strongly supported by Aus-
tralia,65 which, like Britain, did not wish to abandon “the
right which every sovereign state possesses to determine the
composition of its own population, and who shall be ad-
mitted to its territories.”66
International Refugee and Stateless Persons Regimes
Even though the international community in the immediate
aftermath of World War II was not moved by the experience
of that war to recognize a human right to be granted asylum,
it was still faced with the pressing need to resolve the plight
of the thousands displaced from home by the war. As part
of the effort to do so, the United Nations General Assembly
convened the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status
of Refugees and Stateless Persons in July 1951. The Confer-
ence was charged with drafting a Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and a Protocol thereto relating to the
Status of Stateless Persons which took into account draft
treaties already prepared by an ad hoc committee of the
United Nations Economic and Social Council.67 The confer-
ence did indeed manage to draft and adopt a Refugee Con-
vention but ended up leaving the proposed Protocol relating
to the Status of Stateless Persons for another day. A second
conference of plenipotentiaries was held in 1954 to deal with
the Protocol. The conference ended up drafting and adopt-
ing not a Protocol to the Refugee Convention but rather a
separate Statelessness Convention. This Statelessness Con-
vention replicates mutatis mutandis most of the provisions
of the Refugee Convention. The significant Refugee Con-
vention provisions that the Statelessness Convention does
not replicate are Article 31, which prohibits penalization of
refugees for illegal entry or presence (providing certain con-
ditions are met); Article 33, which prohibits refoulement of
refugees;68 and Article 35, which requires states to co-oper-
ate with the Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees in the exercise of its functions including
supervision of the application of the provisions of the Refu-
gee Convention.69
All refugees/stateless persons in a state party’s territory
have the right to have the provisions of the relevant Con-
vention applied without “discrimination as to race, religion
or country of origin,”70 the right of free access to the state
party’s courts,71 and the right to be issued with identity
papers if they do not possess a valid travel document.72 All
refugees/stateless persons in a state party’s territory also
have the right to receive the same treatment as the state’s
nationals with respect to religious freedom73 and elemen-
tary education74 and treatment “not less favourable than
that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances”
with respect to property rights75 and education other than
elementary education.76
Refugees/stateless persons “lawfully in” a state party’s
territory must not be expelled from its territory “save on
grounds of national security or public order.”77 In addition,
all refugees/stateless persons ”lawfully in" a state party’s
territory must be accorded the same rights of freedom of
movement78 and rights to engage in self-employment79
accorded to “aliens generally in the same circumstances.”
All refugees/stateless persons “lawfully staying in” a state
party’s territory must be issued with travel documents for
the purpose of travel outside its territory80 and accorded the
same treatment as the state’s nationals with respect to pub-
lic relief and assistance81 and to labour and social security
rights.82 All refugees/stateless persons “lawfully staying in”
a state party’s territory must also be accorded  housing
rights,83 rights of association,84 and  rights to engage in
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wage-earning employment and practice “liberal profes-
sions”85 that are “not less favourable than that accorded to
aliens generally in the same circumstances.”
Finally, each Convention provides that state parties
“shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and natu-
ralization” of the persons to whom the Convention ap-
plies.86 However, the exhortation falls short of imposing an
obligation on a state party to grant its nationality to persons
to whom the Convention applies.87 This fact is, of course,
entirely in keeping with the refusal of states even to recog-
nize a human right to be granted asylum.
Given that the Refugee Convention and Statelessness
Convention confer certain rights on the persons to whom
they apply, the next question which must be answered is
whether either or both Conventions apply to stateless Pal-
estinians. Refugee Convention Article 1A(2), as modified
by Protocol Article I(2),88 provides that for the purposes of
the Convention, the term “refugee” applies to any person
who:
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nation-
ality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual
residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return
to it. 89
However, Article 1D of the Refugee Convention provides:
This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present
receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other
than  the  United  Nations  High Commissioner for Refugees
protection or assistance.
When such protection or  assistance has  ceased for any
reason, without the position of such persons being definitively
settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by
the General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall
ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this Convention.
Similarly, while Article 1(1) of the Statelessness Convention
provides that for ‘the purpose of this Convention, the term
“stateless person” means a person who is not considered as
a national by any State under the operation of its law,’ Article
1(2) provides:
This Convention shall not apply:
(i) To persons who are at present receiving from organs or
agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance so
long as they are receiving such protection or assistance.
The persons intended to be excluded by these provisions
from the international protection regimes created by each
treaty were Palestinians.90 However, the drafting history of
the Refugee Convention and the Statelessness Convention
makes it clear that the reason for excluding them from the
application of these treaties was that they were intended to
be the beneficiaries of a separate and better international
protection regime.91
On 11 December 1948 the UN General Assembly
adopted Resolution 194, which confirmed the right of re-
turn of displaced Palestinians and also created the United
Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine (UNCCP),
which was charged with facilitating their “repatriation, re-
settlement and economic and social rehabilitation.”92 A
year later, the UN General Assembly created the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine (UNRWA)
as a temporary organization and charged it with providing
emergency relief and social services to Palestinian refu-
gees.93 UNRWA’s limited mandate reflected the fact that
UNCCP was supposed to quickly resolve the plight of dis-
placed Palestinians. This didn’t happen. By 1952, the UN
General Assembly had stripped away most of UNCCP’s
original protection functions and it now exists in name
only.94 UNRWA on the other hand has had many renewals
of its mandate and continues to operate.95 Since 1993,
UNRWA has defined a “Palestinian refugee” as any person
who took refuge in its areas of operation
whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the pe-
riod 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both home and
means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.96
The children of men registered with UNRWA as “Palestinian
refugees” can also register as Palestinian refugees.97 UN-
RWA assists such individuals if they reside within its areas
of operation in the Middle East.
Today, the reference to “organs and agencies of the
United Nations other than the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees ” in Article 1D of the Refugee Con-
vention and Article 1(2)(i) of the Statelessness Convention
is usually read as a reference to UNRWA since UNCCP
doesn’t actually do anything anymore. Those who are in
receipt of UNRWA’s assistance are regarded as being locked
out of the protection regimes of the Refugee Convention
and Statelessness Convention, even though UNRWA’s
mandate does not extend to protection. In other words,
UNRWA’s mandate does not extend to promoting enjoy-
ment of the kinds of rights set out in the Refugee Conven-
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tion and Statelessness Convention or to the most important
aspect of the legal concept of protection, which is facilita-
tion of a durable solution to the plight of the individual (in
the form of repatriation or resettlement).98
Goodwin-Gill and Akram make very strong and persua-
sive arguments in support of the proposition that the sec-
ond paragraph of Article 1D has the effect that “Palestinian
refugees” who leave UNRWA’s areas of operation immedi-
ately and automatically become entitled to the benefits of
the Refugee Convention.99 Most state parties to the Refugee
Convention accept that “Palestinian refugees” who make
their way to places outside UNRWA’s areas of operation are
not excluded from Refugee Convention protection by Arti-
cle 1D. However, most take the position that such individu-
als will only be entitled to Refugee Convention protection
if they meet the Article 1A(2) definition of “refugee.”100
Unfortunately, the determination usually made in relation
to such individuals is that they do not meet the Article 1A(2)
definition of ”refugee.”101
On 8 November 2002, the Full Court of the Federal
Court of Australia decided the case of Minister for Immigra-
tion and Multicultural Affairs v. WABQ.102 The respondent
in the case was a stateless Palestinian registered with UN-
WRA whose place of habitual residence was Syria. The
Refugee Review Tribunal had found that upon leaving
UNRWA’s areas of operation the respondent ceased to be
excluded from the benefits of the Refugee Convention by
Article 1D. It had further found that the respondent had a
well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Syria and
was therefore a refugee within the meaning of the Refugee
Convention. The latter finding was not challenged. How-
ever, the Minister for Immigration argued that it did not
matter that the respondent met the Article 1A(2) definition
of  refugee, because  Article  1D  correctly  interpreted ex-
cluded him from the application of the Convention. Ac-
cording to the Minister the correct interpretation of Article
1D was that a person entitled to receive assistance from
UNRWA was excluded from the benefits of the Refugee
Convention even if that person was no longer within UN-
RWA’s areas of operation for whatever reason (in this case
because he had been forced to flee).
The Full Court allowed the Minister’s appeal because it
found that the Refugee Review Tribunal had indeed erred
in its interpretation of Article 1D. However, the Full Court
did not accept the Minister’s interpretation of Article 1D
either.
Tamberlin J. (with whom Moore J. agreed in a separate
judgment) held that the first paragraph of Article 1D had
the effect that Palestinians as a group were excluded from
the benefits of the Convention because as at 28 July 1951
they were protected by UNCPP and assisted by UNRWA.
However, the second paragraph of Article 1D required a
factual inquiry into whether UNCPP still performed its
protection mandate. If it did not, Palestinians were entitled
to the benefits of the Refugee Convention as long as they
met the definition of refugee set out in Article 1A(2).103 In
the case before the court, of course, the respondent had
already been found to fall within the definition and that
finding had not been challenged. The case was, therefore,
remitted back to the member of the Refugee Review Tribu-
nal who had made the original decision so that a finding of
fact could be made on whether UNCPP was still performing
its protection mandate but without the need for the respon-
dent to re-establish his refugee status if the finding about
UNCPP was (as the court strongly indicated it ought to be)
that it was no longer performing its protection mandate.
Since the decision in Minister for Immigration and Multicul-
tural Affairs v. WABQ, the Refugee Review Tribunal has
been applying the Refugee Convention to Palestinians on
the basis that UNCPP has not provided Palestinians with
protection since 1951 or thereabouts.104
If states interpret Article 1(2)(i) of the Statelessness Con-
vention consistently with their interpretation of Article 1D
of the Refugee Convention, as they logically ought to do,
then most states ought to take the position that once de jure
stateless Palestinians are outside UNRWA areas of opera-
tion they are no longer excluded from the benefits of the
Statelessness Convention by Article 1(2)(i).105 If Australia
interprets Article 1(2)(i) of the Statelessness Convention
consistently with the Full Federal Court’s present interpre-
tation of Article 1D of the Refugee Convention, then it
ought to take the position that Article 1(2)(i) no longer
excludes Palestinians from claiming the benefits of the
Statelessness Convention. However, since Australia’s im-
plementation of its Statelessness Convention obligations is
not the subject of any kind of judicial oversight,106 it cannot
be taken for granted that the executive government will feel
constrained to apply the reasoning in WABQ by analogy to
its interpretation of Article 1(2)(i).
Assuming  that Palestinians  as  a  group are not  (or a
particular Palestinian is not) excluded from the application
of the Statelessness Convention by Article 1(2)(i), they may
still be caught by another of the exclusions listed in Article
1(2). In the present context, the most important of these
other exclusions is Article 1(2)(ii), which provides that the
Statelessness Convention shall not apply
[T]o persons who are recognized by the competent authorities
of the country in which they have taken residence as having the
rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of
the nationality of that country.
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Article 1E of the Refugee Convention contains an analo-
gous exclusion from the application of that Convention.
The only country in the world which could plausibly be
argued to provide its stateless Palestinians residents with
the sort of protection contemplated by Article 1(2)(ii) of
the Statelessness Convention and Article 1E of the Refugee
Convention (without actually conferring nationality) is
Syria.107 However, Australia’s Refugee Review Tribunal
seems to accept that the rights which Palestinians enjoy in
Syria are not sufficient to trigger the Article 1E exclusion.108
International Human Rights Regime
In The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law,
Takkenberg notes that not only is it the case that relatively
few states are parties to the Statelessness Convention but
even in those states few stateless persons have succeeded in
actually  claiming the benefits of that Convention.109 He
suggests that one reason for this is that the ability of an
individual to enjoy most of the rights set out in that Con-
vention is dependent not only on being stateless but also on
having some kind of lawful immigration status in the coun-
try concerned.110 The immigration status of an individual
while in a country of which he or she is not a national is
entirely governed by the domestic law of that country. In-
ternational law has nothing to say about the matter. How-
ever, international law does have something to say about
another matter and that is what rights are due to human
beings as such regardless of other status.
Australia is one of the 153 states111 that are party to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)112 and one of the 150 states113 that are party to the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR).114 Most of the human rights obligations
set out in these two treaties are also customary international
law obligations binding as such even on states which are not
parties to the treaties.115 Some of these customary interna-
tional law human rights obligations have, in fact, become
peremptory norms of international law, which as such
override all inconsistent rules of international law whether
sourced in treaty or custom.116 More significantly, however,
there is growing acceptance of the proposition that inter-
national human rights law as a body of law has primacy over
all other international law, including the specialized inter-
national legal regimes put in  place by states to govern
particular fields of activity.117 Of course, it is only necessary
to determine which of two potentially applicable legal rules
has primacy over the other in a given situation, if the rules
are actually in conflict. Both the Statelessness Convention
and the Refugee Convention make it clear that their provi-
sions are intended to supplement rather than erode the
protections provided to stateless persons and refugees re-
spectively by other sources of law. Article 5 of the Stateless-
ness Convention provides:
Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to impair any
rights and benefits granted by a Contracting State to stateless
persons apart from this Convention.
Article 5 of the Refugee Convention contains an analo-
gous provision. In short, it is possible to turn to interna-
tional human rights law to fill the gaps in the international
protection of stateless persons and refugees that have been
left by the two treaties specifically intended to address the
situation of such persons.118 Australia as a party to the
ICCPR has undertaken to:
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.119
Among other things the ICCPR provides that “[e]very
human being has the inherent right to life” and the right
not to be arbitrarily deprived of it,120 that “[n]o one shall
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment,”121 and that “[e]veryone has the
right to liberty and security of person” and the right not to
be arbitrarily arrested or detained.122 The only ICCPR rights
which in their own terms are owed by a state party to a
subcategory of individuals rather than to all individuals are
the right to freedom of movement,123 the right to due
process before expulsion,124 and the right to participate in
public affairs, vote, and hold political or public office.125
Moreover, the United Nations Human Rights Commit-
tee126 has been at pains to emphasize that:
In general, the rights set forth in the Covenant apply to every-
one, irrespective of reciprocity, and irrespective of his or her
nationality or statelessness.
Thus, the general rule is that each one of the rights of the
Covenant must be guaranteed without discrimination between
citizens and aliens.127
Australia as a party to ICESCR has pursuant to Article 2(1)
undertaken:
to take steps, individually and through international assistance
and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the
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present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particu-
larly the adoption of legislative measures.
The rights recognized in ICESCR include “the right of
everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work
which he freely chooses or accepts”;128 “the right of every-
one to social security, including social insurance”;129 and
“the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for
himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing
and housing.”130
The obligation imposed upon states by Article 2(1) is
greater than may at first be apparent. As interpreted by the
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights,131 Article 2(1) imposes a “minimum core ob-
ligation” on States to realise immediately “minimum
essential levels of each of the rights” contained in the
ICESCR.132 Beyond satisfaction of the minimum core obli-
gation, even developed countries may be able to plead lack
of resources as a reason for failing, at a given point in time,
to realize fully the rights contained in the ICESCR.133 How-
ever, it is important to note that ICESCR Article 2 continues
as follows:
(2) The State Parties to the present Covenant undertake to
guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant
will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, birth or other status.134
This means that state parties, in according the rights set out
in ICESCR to whatever extent, must accord them to all
persons within its jurisdiction without discrimination on
the basis, inter alia, of citizenship status.135 The only excep-
tion to this is contained in Article 2(3) of ICESCR, which
provides:
(3) Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and
their national economy, may determine to what extent they
would guarantee the economic rights recognised in the present
Covenant to non-nationals.
The exception applies only in respect to economic rights and
can be relied upon only by developing countries136 (not
developed countries such as Australia).
In his 2003 Final Report on the Rights of Non-Citizens the
UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Non-Citizens sum-
marized the conclusion of his review of international hu-
man rights law thus:
all persons should by virtue of their essential humanity enjoy all
human rights unless exceptional distinctions, for example, be-
tween citizens and non-citizens, serve a legitimate State objec-
tive and are proportional to the achievement of that objec-
tive.137
This is another way of saying that differential treatment of
citizens and non-citizens is only permissible if the difference
in treatment does not breach the principle of non-discrimi-
nation, which is almost certainly a peremptory norm of
international law.138 The legitimacy of aims and proportion-
ality of means can of course be debated at length, especially
in the context of determining the extent to which non-citi-
zens should be accorded economic and social rights. Even in
that context, however, there is a bottom-line proposition
which emerges with clarity from the jurisprudence of the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: there
can be no justification for differential treatment which in-
volves denying to non-nationals the minimum essential
levels of ICESCR rights necessary for survival.139
The Plight of Stateless Palestinians in Australia
Australia divides non-citizens into two categories: lawful
and unlawful. A non-citizen in Australia who “holds a visa
that is in effect” is a lawful non-citizen.140 Visas can be
permanent (giving permission to remain in Australia indefi-
nitely) or temporary (giving permission to remain in Aus-
tralia for a specified period or until the happening of a
specified event).141 Visas may also be subject to specified
conditions, for example, a condition preventing the holder
from engaging in any work in Australia.142 A non-citizen
who is not a lawful non-citizen is an unlawful non-citizen.143
Sections 189 and 196 of the Migration Act provide that an
unlawful non-citizen in Australia’s migration zone (other
than an excised offshore place) must be detained until re-
moved from Australia, deported, or granted a visa.
Non-citizens in Australia who invoke Australia’s inter-
national protection obligations are permitted to make pro-
tection visa applications. The basic criterion for the grant
of a protection visa is that the applicant is “a non-citizen in
Australia to whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has
protection obligations under the Refugee Convention as
amended  by the  Refugee  Protocol” or is the spouse or
dependant of a protection visa holder.144 The Migration Act
does not give the primary-stage decision maker or the
merits review tribunal the power to grant a protection visa
to an applicant not meeting the criteria for grant of a
protection visa. However, the Minister for Immigration has
been given personal powers to substitute for a decision of
the merits review tribunal another “more favourable” de-
cision, “if the Minister thinks that it is in the public interest
to do so.”145 In exercise of these powers, the Minister is able
to grant a protection visa applicant whatever visa the Min-
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ister thinks fit, even if the applicant does not satisfy the
criteria specified in the regulations for the grant of a visa of
that class. Ministerial guidelines relating to the exercise of
the Minister’s powers of intervention among other things
identify cases of non-citizens to whom Australia has pro-
tection obligations under the Convention Against Torture
and/or the ICCPR as cases in which it may be in the public
interest to substitute a more favourable decision.146 How-
ever, Australia’s obligations under the Statelessness Con-
vention are not specifically mentioned.
Requesting exercise of the Minister’s powers of interven-
tion is the first and only opportunity asylum seekers have
to put non-Refugee Convention protection claims to a
decision maker  who  actually has the ability to  respond
meaningfully to those claims. It is a protection mechanism
which clearly does not meet minimum procedural stand-
ards. First, the Minister for Immigration does not even have
to consider the exercise of the powers; i.e. their exercise is
non-compellable. Second, the Minister is clearly not an
independent decision maker in the sense of being inde-
pendent of  immigration control and  other  government
interests potentially opposed to those of the asylum seeker.
Finally, the claimant does not have effective access to judi-
cial or other independent review.
The Minister’s powers of intervention were exercised in
590 cases in the period 1 July 2002 to 31 December 2003. It
appears that most persons who successfully sought inter-
vention were granted classes of visa other than protection
visas.147 In recent times, the type of visa most likely to be
granted has been a temporary spouse visa because the kind
of case most likely to prompt intervention is that of “an
in-community applicant with an Australian citizen child
and Australian citizen/permanent resident partner.”148
However, use has also been made of a wide range of other
visa  classes.149 By contrast, prior to  1999 it was almost
always the case that a protection visa was granted following
ministerial intervention.150 Johanna Stratton infers from
this change (correctly, I suspect) that the Australian Gov-
ernment has made a policy decision to avoid granting pro-
tection visas following intervention, in order to reinforce
its message that Australia is not a ”soft touch" for asylum
seekers.151 In short, it is far from satisfactory that Australia’s
fulfillment of its obligations under the Statelessness Con-
vention is dependent on the uncertain discretion of the
Minister for Immigration. The upshot is that those entitled
to Australia’s protection under the Statelessness Conven-
tion are unlikely to receive it, unless they happen to be
“refugees” also.
Mr. Al Masri was a Palestinian from the Gaza Strip who
arrived in Australia without authorization and thereby be-
came an unlawful non-citizen. He made a protection visa
application, which was rejected at both primary and merits
review stages on the basis that Australia did not owe him
protection obligations under the Refugee Convention. Sec-
tion 198(1) of the Migration Act provides that an “officer
must remove as soon as reasonably practicable an unlawful
non-citizen who asks the Minister, in writing, to be so
removed.”152 Immediately upon receiving the negative
merits review decision, Mr. Al Masri made a written request
to be returned to the Gaza Strip and did not at any stage
thereafter seek to remain in Australia. Whether the Minister
for Immigration might have been moved to exercise the
ministerial powers of intervention on the basis of Austra-
lia’s obligations under the Statelessness Convention must
therefore remain a matter of speculation.
Israel did not oppose Mr. Al Masri’s return to Gaza but
would not permit Australia to return him via Israel. The
alternatives acceptable to Israel were return through Jordan
or Egypt, but those countries also refused to permit transit
through their territories. Mr. Al Masri, who found himself
faced with the prospect of indefinite detention in Australia,
sought a court order for release.
The judge at first instance held that the relevant provi-
sions of the Migration Act were
to be construed as authorising detention only for so long as: the
minister is taking all reasonable steps to secure the removal
from Australia of a removee as soon as is reasonably practicable;
[and] the removal of the removee from Australia is “reasonably
practicable”, in the sense that there must be a real likelihood or
prospect of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.153
His Honour then found as a matter of fact that there was no
real likelihood or prospect of Mr. Al Masri’s removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future and accordingly ordered Mr.
Al Masri’s release from detention. The Minister for Immi-
gration appealed the decision to the Full Federal Court of
Australia.
Following the first-instance decision in the Al Masri case,
two competing lines of authority developed in the Federal
Court of Australia. One line of authority followed the Al
Masri decision. The other line of cases did not, on the basis
that the decision was plainly wrong. On 15 April 2003, the
Full Federal Court handed down its decision in Minister for
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Al Masri.154 The
Court emphasized that it was a principle of statutory con-
struction that legislation ought not to be read as curtailing
fundamental rights or freedoms unless there was a “clear
expression of an unmistakable and an unambiguous inten-
tion” to do so.155 It then said, in the context of the case
before it:
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The manifestation of such an intention must be such as to show
clearly, and unmistakably, that the detention is to continue for as
long as may be necessary and might even (as a theoretical possibil-
ity) be permanent, that it is intended that detention should con-
tinue without foreseeable end irrespective of the age, gender,
personal or family circumstances of the person, irrespective of the
unlikelihood (if such be the case) of a person absconding and
irrespective of the absence (if such be the case) of any threat
presented to the Australian community of a person detained.156
The Court held that the statutory scheme of mandatory
detention manifested no such clear intention. Rather, it
seemed to have been assumed by Parliament that detention
would always come to an end one way or another. The
Court, therefore, agreed with the first-instance judge that
as a matter of statutory construction the power to detain
was limited “to circumstances where there is a real likeli-
hood or prospect of the removal of the person from Aus-
tralia in the reasonably foreseeable future.”157 It
commented that it felt “fortified” in its conclusion by the
fact that such a construction also accorded with the princi-
ple that so far as its language permits a statute should be
read as conforming with Australia’s treaty obligations, in-
cluding under Article 9(1) of the ICCPR (the prohibition
on arbitrary detention).158
Although the first instance Al Masri decision was upheld
by the Full Federal Court in Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs v. Al Masri, the Australian Govern-
ment was far from pleased and it became evident that the
High Court of Australia would have to settle the matter.
Special leave to appeal the Full Federal Court decision in Al
Masri was refused by the High Court on the basis that the
Government had subsequently  managed to procure the
return of Mr. Al Masri to Gaza. However, appeals to the
Full Federal Court from two first-instance Federal Court
decisions which raised the same question of law as was
raised by the Al Masri case were removed to the High Court
for resolution. On 6 August 2004, the High Court handed
down its decisions in these two cases. In each case, the court
was divided four to three, with the majority holding that
the Al Masri decision was not good law. The judges’ reasons
for decision are set out in full in Al-Kateb v. Godwin.159
Mr. Al-Kateb was a stateless160 Palestinian who was born
and spent most of his life in Kuwait. He arrived in Australia
without  authorization and thereby became an  unlawful
non-citizen subject to detention. He made a protection visa
application which was rejected at both primary and merits
review stages and an application for judicial review of the
visa decision which was also unsuccessful.161 At this point,
Mr. Al-Kateb made a written request to be removed from
Australia, nominating Kuwait or Gaza as preferred destina-
tions.162 As in the case of Mr. Al Masri, however, the Aus-
tralian Department of Immigration was unable to find any
country prepared to allow entry to Mr. Al-Kateb. The first-
instance judge found on the evidence there was no real
likelihood or prospect of removal in the reasonably foresee-
able future,163 but, choosing to follow the line of authority
holding that Al Masri v. Minister for Immigration and Mul-
ticultural  Affairs  and Indigenous Affair was  wrongly de-
cided,164 held that Mr. Al-Kateb was not entitled to release
from detention.165
The High Court majority (McHugh, Hayne, Callinan,
and Heydon JJ.)166 held that the relevant provisions of the
Migration Act, by providing that detention of an unlawful
non-citizen must continue “until” the occurrence of one of
three specified events (i.e. grant of a visa, removal, or
criminal deportation), had the effect of unambiguously
authorizing the indefinite detention of unlawful non-citi-
zens in the unfortunate position of neither qualifying for
the grant of a visa nor, in practice, being removable/deport-
able from Australia in the foreseeable future. In particular,
section 198 by imposing a duty to effect removal “as soon
as reasonably practicable” did not thereby impose any kind
of temporal limitation on detention.
According to Hayne J. (McHugh and Heydon JJ. agreeing),
The duty remains unperformed: it has not yet been practicable
to effect removal. That is not to say that it will never happen.
This appellant’s case stands as an example of why it cannot be
said that removal will never happen. His prospects of being
removed to what is now the territory in Gaza under the admini-
stration of the Palestinian Authority are, and will continue to
be, much affected by political events in several countries in the
Middle East. It is not possible to predict how those events will
develop ….
Because there can be no certainty about whether or when the
non?citizen will be removed, it cannot be said that the Act
proceeds from a premise (that removal will be possible) which
can be demonstrated to be false in any particular case…. And
even if, as in this case, it is found that “there is no real likelihood
or prospect of [the non-citizen’s] removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future”, that does not mean that continued deten-
tion is not for the purpose of subsequent removal. The legisla-
ture having authorised detention until the first point at which
removal is reasonably practicable, it is not possible to construe
the words used as being subject to some narrower limitation
such, for example, as what Dixon J referred to in Koon Wing Lau
as “a reasonable time”.167
Having decided the question of statutory construction,
the majority judges had to consider whether the statutory
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provisions were, as argued by the appellant, constitution-
ally invalid. All four majority judges held that the provi-
sions were constitutionally valid, being an exercise of the
power conferred on the Australian Parliament by section
51(xix) of the Australian Constitution to legislate with re-
spect to aliens which in their view did not infringe the
separation of powers provided for by Chapter III of the
Constitution.
Asylum-seeker advocates were horrified by the High
Court decision, pointing out that as a result of it some
stateless non-citizens faced the prospect of being held in
Australian immigration detention for literally the rest of
their lives. The Minister for Immigration denied this was
the case, pointing out in her turn that she had the powers
of intervention discussed earlier in this article which she
was willing to exercise in appropriate cases.168 In order to
demonstrate her bona fides she ordered a review of all cases
affected by the High Court decision.169 Twenty-four cases
were reviewed.170 The Minister granted bridging visas to the
individuals concerned in nine cases where the person had
been “cooperative with removal arrangements,” their iden-
tity had been “firmly established,” and removal was “likely
to be protracted.”171 In thirteen other cases the Minister
refused to grant a visa, which in three cases meant the
re-detention of persons previously released by court or-
der.172 The remaining two cases were still under review at
the time of writing.
In order to escape characterization as “arbitrary” under
international law, detention must be permitted by domestic
law and must also be a necessary and proportionate means
of achieving a legitimate end.173 Detention would be pro-
portionate, if the importance to society of the end to be
achieved by detention could reasonably be said to outweigh
the importance to the individual of physical liberty and the
negative impact on the individual of deprivation of liberty.
Since the negative impact of detention on the individual
tends to increase as the duration of detention increases,174
duration of detention is a relevant factor in assessing pro-
portionality. It defies credulity to suggest that indefinite
detention of persons who cannot be removed from Austra-
lia could possibly be a proportionate means of achieving the
objective of immigration control. Thus the thirteen indi-
viduals, including stateless Palestinians, to whom the Min-
ister refused to grant visas, are being subjected to arbitrary
detention in contravention of Article 9(1) of the ICCPR.175
The purpose of a bridging visa, as the name implies, is to
bridge the time that elapses while a substantive visa appli-
cation is being processed or while arrangements are being
made for a  non-citizen to depart  Australia.  In general,
however, unauthorized arrivals are not eligible for the grant
of a bridging visa, which is why grant of such a visa in the
nine cases above mentioned required exercise of the Min-
ister’s powers of intervention. A non-citizen with a bridging
visa has the status of a lawful non-citizen and is, therefore,
not subject to immigration detention. The problem with
court-ordered release from detention was that all that it
procured for stateless persons was the dubious benefit of
being at liberty in the community but without lawful im-
migration status or clear rights. I am informed by practitio-
ners familiar with the cases that, lawful status apart, the
situation of the nine individuals released on bridging visas
is as unenviable. In particular, the bridging visas have been
granted subject to the conditions that the holders must not
engage in work, studies, or training in Australia.
An Australian citizen or permanent resident (i.e. perma-
nent visa holder) who has inadequate means of support will
usually fall within one of the categories of persons entitled
to a social security payment under the Social Security Act
1991 (Cth). If all else fails, an Australian citizen or perma-
nent resident with inadequate means of support is able to
seek exercise of the discretion of the Secretary of the Com-
monwealth Department of Family and Community Serv-
ices to make a payment known as a “special benefit”
payment.176 However, with the exception of certain protec-
tion visa applicants who are able to meet very restrictive
eligibility criteria,177 bridging and other temporary visa
holders are not able to access Commonwealth funded social
assistance. Australia also has a taxpayer-funded “universal”
health insurance scheme, Medicare,  which ensures  that
Australian citizens, Australian permanent residents, New
Zealand citizens, and, subject to certain eligibility criteria,
permanent visa applicants are able to access medical serv-
ices without payment.178 Stateless Palestinians, who have
already been through the protection visa application proc-
ess and have been unsuccessful, are unable to access any of
this Commonwealth-funded social assistance. In most
cases, they are not able to access State/Territory or local
government funded social assistance either.179 They must
turn, therefore, to community sector welfare agencies to
have their survival needs met. That these needs will be met
is far from certain.
The Statelessness Convention only requires that work
rights and social assistance rights be given to stateless per-
sons “lawfully staying in” the state party’s territory.180
Goodwin-Gill takes the view that the same phrase used in
the Refugee Convention means “something more than
mere lawful presence.”181 While stateless persons on bridg-
ing visas are lawfully present in Australia, it could well be
argued that they are not ”lawfully staying in" Australia in
the sense of being given resident status. While it appears to
me that allowing states to so interpret “lawfully staying in”
runs the risk of rendering most of the provisions in the
Volume 23 Refuge Number 2
116
Statelessness Convention (and Refugee Convention)
meaningless, I need not pursue the question here since it is
possible to turn instead to ICESCR. As noted in the pre-
vious section,  the  Committee on Economic, Social  and
Cultural Rights has yet to be convinced that any policy
objective is so important that refusing to meet the basic
survival needs of particular individuals (as Australia is in
relation to some stateless Palestinians) can be considered a
proportionate method of achieving that objective. Austra-
lia’s treatment of stateless Palestinians in the community
(who are not protection visa applicants) is, therefore, in
breach of its obligations under ICESCR.
Taking Responsibility for the Past
Each human person is able to imagine possible futures and
to will and act to achieve one future rather than another.182
It is an attribute that makes human beings unique among
living creatures. For practical purposes, national societies
too can be ascribed agency in the sense that the individuals
who make it up collectively will and act to achieve a chosen
future. Most of us do conceive of ourselves as participating
in a collective national project. Moreover, even those of us
who are alienated from the goals of this collective project are
still participating in it, if only by  accepting the benefits
generated through it. Confronted with the reality that there
are other human beings in the world, the moral question that
arises is how we as individuals and national societies should
take account of this in our own willing and acting. The
reason this article has dwelt so much on history is that every
decision we make as individuals and societies we make in the
context of a past that cannot be changed. Being morally
responsible requires of us an “ex post facto account for what
has been done” as well as a taking into account of the welfare
of others in the “forward determination of what is to be
done.”183 Our past actions may already have given particular
persons moral claims upon us that must  be taken into
account in the decision we are faced with now.184
One category of persons to whom it would be widely
accepted I have special duties arising out of past actions
consists of those to whom I have made promises under-
stood to be binding.185 My duty is to keep my promise.
Likewise, if our state makes such promises on our behalf it
ought to keep those promises.186 By becoming party to the
Refugee Convention, Statelessness Convention, ICCPR,
and ICESCR, Australia has made promises, which since
made ought not to be broken.187 It has been demonstrated
in this article that if Australia took its duty of promise
keeping as seriously as it ought, the circumstances of state-
less  Palestinians in Australia would  be vastly  improved
without the need to invoke any other moral duties.
Another category of persons to whom it would be widely
accepted that I have special duties arising out of past action
consists of persons that I have wrongfully harmed.188 My
duty is to make reparation. Analogously, if the state insti-
tutions through which we act collectively wrongfully harm
others we have collective duties to repair the harm. How-
ever, many of us refuse to accept that this is so where the
wrongs in question were committed before we were born.
Ross Poole puts the question in these terms:
By what line of inheritance do contemporary Australians inherit
the sins of the predecessors? And which contemporary Austra-
lians? Is it only those of us of Anglo-Celtic stock whose ancestors
came to Australia in the nineteenth century? Should we exclude
those recent immigrants, especially those whose background is
free from the taints of European colonialism and imperialism?
And what of those Australians whose ancestors had no choice
in the decision to migrate, but were brought over as convicts?189
Poole’s answer is that our responsibility for past actions
results from our identification with the entity, which per-
formed those actions. In his words,
A national identity involves, not just a sense of place, but a sense
of history. The history constitutes the national memory, and it
provides a way of locating those who share that identity within
a historical community…. Acquiring a national identity is a way
of acquiring that history and the rights and the responsibilities
which go with it. The responsibility to come to terms with the
Australian past is a morally inescapable component of what it
is to be Australian. 190
Elazar Barkan makes a similar argument191 and adds that if
we are willing to be the beneficiaries of our forebears’ en-
deavours, we must also take responsibility for redressing the
wrongs inflicted on others in the course of those endeav-
ours.192 Moreover, he demonstrates through detailed case
studies that, in fact,
This desire to redress the past is a growing trend, which touches
our life at multiple levels, and it is central to our moral self-un-
derstanding as individuals and members of groups the world
over.193
Australia was part of the British Empire until World War
II.194 Even after it had ceased to be a formal part of the
Empire it continued to make common cause with Britain
and most Australians identified with British interests as
their own. This was certainly the case in relation to Palestine
throughout the time that Britain was the Mandatory
power.195 The historical narrative at the beginning of this
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article was intended to demonstrate that the British Empire
and later Australia as an independent nation have been
deeply implicated in creating the present plight of stateless
Palestinians. It is a plight created in part by our broken
promises,196 our abuse of power,197 our willingness to wel-
come Israel as a legitimate member of the international
community once it was established as a fact on the ground
without first insisting on a just resolution of the plight of
the Palestinians thereby rendered stateless, and our refusal
to give legal expression to a meaningful right of asylum.
It is the case, of course, that the moral standards of
particular  societies  change  over time. Historical actions
which Australians judge to be wrong by standards now
prevailing were not necessarily perceived to be wrong at the
time they were undertaken. In acknowledging this “presen-
tist moral predicament,” one of the examples Barkan gives
is, in fact, the failure of Western nations, then steeped in a
colonialist mentality, to recognize in the first part of the
twentieth century that support for the creation of Israel
redressed earlier injustice against the Jews at the price of
inflicting new injustice upon the Arab Palestinians.198 He
suggests, “[w]hen we (re)classify historical acts as injus-
tices, we presumably determine that were we to face similar
choices, we would act differently.”199 In other words, the
reclassification of past action is vital to our present moral
self-understanding.200
It is worth emphasizing that the argument that Austra-
lia ought to take moral responsibility for the historical
wrongs in which it was complicit does not let other people
off the moral hook for their actions or vice versa. Quite
clearly, Israel, the Arab states, and Palestinian leaders
have over time played a large part in creating and main-
taining the sorry circumstances in which stateless Pales-
tinians find themselves. They, too, are morally responsible
for those circumstances. As many philosophers have ex-
plained, the attribution of moral responsibility is not a
zero-sum game.201 However, the question for Australians
is what Australia should do to discharge its moral obliga-
tions. The treatment of stateless Palestinians in Australia
and elsewhere from 1948 to the present day illustrates the
continuing truth of Hannah Arendt’s observation that:
The conception of human rights, based upon the assumed
existence of a human being as such, broke down at the very
moment when those who professed to believe in it were for the
first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all other
qualities and specific relationships – except that they were still
human.202
Since the individual who is nothing but a human being
cannot in fact enjoy all of their human rights anywhere, it
is suggested that one means of redressing past wrongs to
which Australia ought to give serious consideration is to
heed the urging of Article 32 of the Statelessness Conven-
tion and “as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and
naturalization” of stateless Palestinians in Australia who
have nowhere else to turn.
Postscript:
Recent reforms to Australia’s immigration detention regime
have given the Minister for Immigration the power to ame-
liorate the plight of long-term detainees, including the state-
less, if the Minister wishes. Since 16 June 2005, persons in
immigration detention whose “removal from Australia is
not reasonably practicable” for the time being have been
eligible for the grant of a Removal Pending Bridging Visa
(RPBV), provided the Minister is satisfied that the person
“will do everything possible to facilitate” their removal from
Australia and any visa applications (with specified excep-
tion) have been finally determined. They also have to meet
character and national security requirements. Unfortu-
nately, only detainees invited to do so by the Minister for
Immigration are able to apply for a RPBV. As at 14 July 2005
the Minister had invited fifty-eight individuals to apply for
a RPBV and forty-two of them had taken up the invitation.
However, as at 13 February 2006 there had only been a total
of thirty-one grants of RPBVs. If granted, a RPBV enables
the holder to  remain  at liberty  in the  community until
removal from Australia becomes reasonably practicable.
Importantly, the holders of RPBVs are given some social
assistance entitlements and have the right to work. Never-
theless, they remain in an unenviable state of limbo.
Since 29 June 2005 the Minister for Immigration has also
had a personal and non-compellable power under section
195A of the Migration Act to grant a visa to a person who is
in detention under section 189, if “the Minister thinks that
it is in the public interest to do so.” Exercising this power,
the Minister is now able to bring any long-detention situ-
ation to an end by granting the detainee a bridging visa or
indeed a substantive visa regardless of whether the person
in question meets the usual visa criteria. During the period
1 July 2005 to 31 December 2005 the section 195A power
was exercised eighteen times.
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recognize the rights and interests in land of the indigenous
inhabitants of settled colonies, an unjust and discrimina-
tory doctrine of that kind can no longer be accepted. The
expectations of the international community accord in
this respect with the contemporary values of the Austra-
lian people.” ((1992) 107 ALR 1, 28–29).
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